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ADP systems have become vital to many Navy activities
and thus have created a need for disaster planning which
will ensure the continued operation of these systems.
However, disaster planning is expensive, long-drawn, and
difficult to implement under day-to-day operational
commitments.
This study analyzes the directives governing Navy ADP
disaster planning, presents affordable alternatives, and
suggests the need for a Navy support team to assist in the
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although Automatic Data Processing (ADP) systems are
becoming so vital to the very existence of many Federal
activities, there has been surprisingly little preparation
for the event of a sudden disaster which might annihilate
both the system and the essential decision-making capability
provided. This paper will analyze some of the options
available to provide contingency planning for such
disasters. It is shocking to see the types of
organizations that would be rendered useless and the chaos
that would result if their systems were damaged by a
disaster. In this discussion, the term "disaster" will
refer to major fires, storms, flooding, sabotage, theft,
power loss, air conditioning failure, or even personnel
actions such as strikes, terrorism, etc. which exceed a
critical time limit. This is to differentiate from a
computer outage, which generally lasts a short, tolerable
time.
Organizations have generally been most interested in
getting new systems on line as quickly as possible and
integrating them into the main stream of day-to-day
business. This has created a dangerous level of dependence
on computers to the point of threatening extinction for the
organization should the computer be eliminated. The problem

is that in the haste to get these computers operational, an
important issue has been overlooked—disaster planning. In
most cases, disaster planning is an afterthought and occurs
at a time when a tremendous effort is necessary just to
figure out what applications are important to the
organization. There are indications which suggest that in
the Navy, not only is disaster planning an afterthought, but
it is often "sitting on the back burner" waiting for a
disaster to prove its worth. Despite numerous cases of
computer centers being wiped out by disaster, too many data
center managers believe that it won't happen to them. What
if it did ? Are Navy ADP facilities prepared to handle major
disasters? Are there adequate guidance and specific
directives which ensure preparedness? If a specific Navy
ADP center is not qualified or capable of preparing its own
disaster plan, who may it contact for assistance? What
contingency options are available? These critical questions




A. GAO STUDY ON CURRENT STATE OF PREPAREDNESS
In a report to the Congress dated 18 December 1980, the
General Accounting Office (GAO) claimed that most federal
agencies "have not developed adequate ADP backup plans to
minimize disruption of their ADP systems and maintain con-
tinuity of operations in an emergency." [1] In a review of
55 federal activities, GAO did not find one ADP backup plan
which it considered adequate. This is quite astounding
evidence that either current directives on disaster planning
are too weak to enforce, or they are not fully understood by
the federal agencies. Do ADP managers actually believe that
they are complying with contingency planning requirements?
According to the GAO, federal agencies have placed far less
importance on ADP backup than commercial organizations have.
Why is this so? Obviously, a commercial activity is at risk
of going out of business should its computer system fail.
Its profits are linked to the information processing
capability, so it is easy to justify the cost of disaster
planning as a type of insurance. Its long term benefits
outweigh the initial cost. The Navy on the other hand, does
not believe in insuring computers, and has quite a different
set of objectives. In the government, the head of each

agency is responsible for its continued existence, and
therefore the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) has
directed in its circular A-71 Transmittal Memorandum 1
(dated July 27,1978) that "the head of each executive branch
department and agency is responsible for assuring an ade-
quate level of security for all agency data." Such a sec-
urity program must include:
1 . Periodic risk analysis to determine vulnerability and
minimize potential for loss.
2. Establishment of an appropriate contingency plan to
insure continuity of operations should a disaster
occur which would interrupt normal operations.
3. A periodic review and test of contingency plans.
The GAO believes that these 0MB requirements are not
being properly enforced and that high level management is
not acting to prevent major loss of ADP capability through
contingency planning. In most cases, proper risk analysis
has not been made to determine the impact of lost ADP
systems and even when it has, the contingency plans are
inadequate. The problem is compounded by conflicting
requirements placed upon agencies, budgetary constraints
(reliable backup is very expensive), and a lack of clear
authoritative guidelines. Contingency planning is too
often dealt with as a subsidiary of security discussions,
and must be brought to the forefront in ADP acquisition and
management as a critical issue.
Commercial facilities are currently available to speci-
fically handle disaster backup and are utilized by private
10

industry. Several firms have even cooperated to build their
own backup facilities and thus reduce costs by sharing
expenses. Why can't Navy ADP activities do the same?
B. COMPUTER CENTER MANAGERS' POINTS OF VIEW
My interviews with several Navy computer center managers
have indicated that indeed these managers believe they are
personally responsible for ensuring that their disaster
plans are adequate. However, they do not see any evidence
of enforcement of disaster planning requirements. Although
stated in the Department of the Navy's ADP Security Program
Manual (OPNAVINST 5239.1 A, Chapter 7 and Appendix J), mini-
mum disaster planning requirements are difficult to
ascertain because so much is left to the discretion of
Commanding Officers [2]. Many managers feel that a
reciprocal agreement with another Data Processing Center
(see chapter V-C-1 for explanation of these agreements) is
adequate for backup. GAO does not feel that these consti-
tute valid backup plans. Certainly they can not be proven
valid unless tested on a regular basis. OPNAVINST 5239.1 A
covers the requirement to annually test and evaluate a
contingency plan (ch.7,pg.6), but the directive is very
weak. It states,
"Testing can be as extensive as transferring the entire
ADP operation to an off-site facility or as minimal as
conducting a fire alarm test. The depth and scope of the
11

operational testing is dependent upon the practicality and
importance of demonstrating that the plan works."
This leaves quite a bit up to the discretion of the data
processing center manager and the Commanding Officers of DP
activities. As long as the Designated Approving Authority
(DAA), the superior responsible for approving the ADP
security program, is satisfied, a contingency plan which
relies upon a reciprocal agreement may be accepted and may
require little or no testing.
How then can the ADP manager be sure that his contingen-
cy plan will ever work? Testing and evaluation of the plans
are often limited by budget constraints even though the
activity is directed to plan and budget for regular
testing. These budget constraints will become even more
apparent when Navy Regional Data Automation Centers
(NARDACS) ' begin operating under Navy Industrial Funding
this year. Who will pay for the costs of a contingency plan
at NARDACS? Is this an overhead expense to be passed on to
1
'NARDACS are regional data processing service centers
established by the Navy to provide computer support to Navy
activities in the area. This regionalization is purported to
reduce duplication of effort and provide economies of scale
to smaller activities which might not be able to operate
their own centers.
^Navy Industrial Funding as applied to NARDACS, is
action to make them operate as profit centers in competition
with commercial DP contractors. This will necessitate use of
accurate chargeback policies so that they can completely
cover the costs of operation (they will not necessarily show
a profit, but merely break even).
12

the customer? Another critical issue is how can a service
agency such as a NARDAC develop a contingency plan that fits
into a customer base of widely varying needs and diverse
mission objectives. Before delving into these stimulating
questions, it is necessary to lay the foundation of what
goes into a contingency plan. The next several chapters will
discuss the government's dependence upon computers, outline
the need for ADP security, and then present details for
developing a contingency plan.
13

III. GOVERNMENT DEPENDENCE ON COMPUTERS
As a matter of background, it is interesting to note the
level of dependence our government has come to place upon
computers. The capacity of modern day computers for reducing
mountainous volumes of work has made them a mainstay in such
organizations as the Bureau of the Census and the Social
Security Administration (SSA). Consider that prior to 1890,
through purely manual calculation, it took seven to nine
years to just count the population of 70 million. Today it
takes less than a year to compile a census for over 200
million people plus provide useful statistical data on
labor, the economy and hundreds of other studies. [3]
Although the magnitude of the census system makes it
invaluable, the consequences of losing it for a few weeks
would be nothing compared to the SSA's operation. The
Social Security act of 1935 made it necessary to maintain
employment records on all working people and established one
of the world's biggest bookkeeping jobs. The SSA main-
tains about a trillion records and pays out over 100 billion
dollars in benefits. [4] Imagine the chaos and personal
hardship if these checks didn't get out on time. The
manipulation of huge volumes of data originally caused the
computer to be rooted in government operations. The
14

situation has long since nullified the option to shift to
the manual processing mode in an emergency.
This however, is only one problem. The centralization
of data resources has made vital information dangerously
susceptible to a catastrophic loss. The rapid growth of the
United States, and the government's involvement in
maintaining data on its population for tax purposes, bene-
fits, resource management, etc. have made the computer an
indispensable tool. While federal employment has leveled
off since the 1970's, the number of computers in use in the
government has increased by an order of magnitude.[ 5 ] Have
computers taken the place of federal employees? Perhaps,
but they have also relieved them of some mundane clerical
jobs. A GAO study indicates that computers have enabled the
government to do its work with 600,000 less employees in
1980 than would have been required without computer s. [ 6
]
Computers have made us more efficient and have established
this efficiency as a standard way of life. Could we return
to the old inefficient ways if computers were taken out of
action? Probably not! The state of affairs has come too far,
and many automated applications today were never done
manually to begin with.
Given the demonstrated dependence on computing, the




IV. THE NEED FOR ADP SECURITY
A. VULNERABILITY OF CENTRALIZED DATA
Would you trust the most valuable secrets of your
company to a stranger who walked in from the street ? Would
you leave your most detailed financial reports, customer
listings, and manufacturing cost summaries lying around the
front lobby? Would you print everything necessary for
stealing or ruining your organization in the daily
newspaper, or set yourself up to be taken hostage? Not
intentionally of course, but that is exactly what you are
doing by entrusting all of this information to a computer
without a thorough information security plan. Although most
ADP managers realize the need for information security, they
rarely comprehend the vulnerability of their systems, and
they fail to understand the actual value of computing
resources to the survival of their organizations.
The topic of computer and information security is much
too broad in scope for complete coverage in this paper, but
a thorough discussion of disaster planning must include
security considerations and if nothing else, a few horror
stories and security foulups to emphasize the necessity for
comprehensive contingency planning.
Before the advent of microcomputers and prior to the




of hardware down dramatically), maintaining a corporate
database was expensive (in the millions of dollars range).
The most economical means of keeping a vast amount of infor-
mation was through a centralized database. The most
economical means of computing in general was to put all of
the expensive resources in one place and share them as
widely as possible. In most cases it was clearly too costly
to give branch offices their own computers. Centralization
was appealing for numerous reasons:
1. It facilitated corporate management level control
over resources.
2. Centralized ADP support staff (less people, less
dupl icat ion of effort, greater concentration of
expertise)
.
3. Consistent maintenance and operations standards
for hardware and software.
4. Planned, controlled growth.
These appealing features have created a belief that
centralization is always good. They have also clouded the
fact that centralization of databases and ADP resources is a
dangerous practice which makes the organization unacceptably
vulnerable to ADP disaster (unless a valid disaster recovery
plan is in effect). References on distributed systems make
''For discussion on hardware pricing trends, see Ref. [23]
See Harold Lorin, reference [24].
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convincing arguments that distributed computer systems can
be an economical and safe (secure and well backed up)
alternative to centralization. This point will be discussed
in section V-C-2 under Recovery and Backup Plans.
When an entire organization becomes dependent on
its computing resources to the extent that denial of such
resources would put it out of business, security had better
be a paramount consideration. Additionally, many managers
fail to realize that there are legal requirements to protect
company assets and that failure to do so is criminal
negligence. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977
requires that corporate officers "maintain accountability
for assets [and that] access to assets is only permitted in
accordance with management's general or specific authoriza-
tion." [7] Individual penalties for top executives can reach
ten thousand dollars and five years imprisonment (in cases
where such assets are lost or destroyed due to
negligence).[8 ] These assets include hardware, software, and
information (data and documents). The FCPA is even more
specific about accounting procedures and mandates detailed
record keeping of transactions. If these functions are
performed by computer, they absolutely must be traceable,
reproducible, and in accordance with accepted accounting
principles. This requires that valuable records (computer
files, tapes, etc.) be protected against fire, flood,
sabotage, and any other disaster imaginable.
18

Aside from the legal requirements, if managers intend to
keep the business going in the face of disaster they had
better enforce a policy on disaster planning. It is a sad
reality that most users of computing resources don't realize
the value of their system until they are denied its use or
until they are charged for it. Whatever the current cost
(charge), it would be considered inexpensive if compared to
a reconstruction effort in the aftermath of a disaster; but
this need not be the case if such a contingency has been
prepared for.
B. MAGNITUDE OF COMPUTER- MADE DECISIONS, IMPLICATIONS OF
POSSIBLE ERRORS AND LOSS
It isn't necessary to delve into much detail on the
magnitude of computer-made decisions; however, it is
noteworthy that such decisions are increasing at an alarming
rate. Computers are in charge of shipping and ordering
supplies, controlling critical machinery, sending out
payrolls, generating invoices, ordering services , and in
general making billions of dollars worth of decisions ,
often with neither human review nor intervention [9]. This
is a trend that has made organizations vulnerable to extreme
losses from both computer errors and complete disaster to
the computing resources,
A University of Minnesota study showed drastic decline
in business activity as ADP outage continues over time.[10]
19

Within one week most automated activities cease to function
altogether. Financial loss which occurs and loss of
customers is often beyond restoration.^ How does this apply
to Navy ADP facilities where profit is not necessarily an
organizational objective? Although the profit motive may
not necessarily exist. Navy Industrial Funding (NIF)
requirements will force Navy Regional Data Automation
Centers (NARDAC) to at least break even. Additionally,
there is ample evidence supporting the need for
uninterrupted ADP operations in terms of minimizing cost to
the taxpayers, and in terms of accomplishing the Navy's or
DOD's mission. Examples of this exigency include:
1 . Vital Tactical Systems
Vital Tactical Systems such as the Worldwide
Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) are
particularly complicated disaster recovery scenarios due to
security considerations and the specialized nature of their
applications. This paper is concerned with more general
ADP operations and therefore tactical systems will not be
discussed further.
^ One Washington D.C. area bank who is a member of
Bancon, Inc. lost over $30,000 in interest over a 24 hour
outage - Ref. [6]; An airline reservation system manager
indicated that it costs the airline over $300,000 through




2. Logistics and Supply Support for the Navy
These systems make the Navy susceptible to both
monetary loss and reduction in mission capability. Repair
parts are necessary to keep our combat forces in action and
a supply center computer disaster could be a serious threat
to combat readiness. It certainly would slow down supply
operations to an unbearable level. Think of how valuable
the database must be and consider the implications (in
manhours and dollars) of reproducing it. In some cases it
would be impossible to replace in the event of a disaster.
The magnitude of controlling parts inventory and supplies
(over 3.5 million items of supply valued at $200 billion
[11] is such that we could no longer hope to fall back on
manual methods and therefore are obligated to guarantee the
continued operation of ADP centers.
3. Navy Payroll
Finance and payroll systems are an invitation for
financial chaos in the event of computer disaster.
Disruption of the pay system would also create impossible
morale problems if paychecks were not distributed on time.
If records were destroyed, there would be an unbelievably
complex reconstruction effort necessary in order to
regenerate the lost data, and there would be a great
exposure to possible fraud.
21

4, Navy Regional Data Automation Centers
These service centers are entrusted with processing
data for numerous Navy customers. It is unlikely that their
customers have prepared for a computer disaster, and it is
incumbent upon the NARDAC to provide not only protection for
data, software and hardware but some assurance of continuity
in operations. In reality, disaster planning should be
conducted by all parties in this scenario in order to
determine critical applications and the extent of damage
possible due to computer outage. This topic will be
discussed further in chapter VI under Applicability of
Disaster Planning to Navy ADP.
In addition to financial, organizational, mission-
degrading, and morale problems, there are situations where
human life is threatened by computer disasters. This is
usually a clearly recognized risk in systems which control
machinery, nuclear power plants, air traffic, and hospital
life support systems and hopefully a valid disaster recovery
plan is in effect. Government regulatory agencies and
auditors are very concerned in these cases and generally
mandate a disaster plan. The implications of a computer
disaster are serious and the following chapters will discuss





If the previous arguments have not been convincing
enough to encourage contingency planning, the next will
be— contingency plans are required by law for most Navy
ADP operations. Specific directives and their applicability
will be covered in chapter VI. Now that the importance of
contingency planning has been shown, how does one go about
implementing such a plan?
A. RISK ANALYSIS
The first and most essential step of a contingency plan
is to conduct a thorough risk analysis. Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 31 [12] gives quite
detailed procedures for carrying out risk analysis and cites
three major categories with which to deal--loss potential
estimate, threat analysis and annual loss expectancy.
1 . Loss Potential Estimate
This phase involves identifying the data center's
assets and assigning a value to them. Critical applications
must be determined and a priority scheme established. The
operations manager should know this scheme in order to carry
out his daily functions. In dealing with scheduling and
in coping with minor outages the operations staff should
have a feel for which jobs are most critical. But do they
23

know which people are most critical or what data files are
important?
a. Assets
The following categories of assets must be
considered in terms of their replacement costs (in dollars)
,
the time period required to replace them, the specific










7. Supplies (especially difficult to procure items such
as personalized checks, customized forms, etc.)
8. Telecommunications
b. Loss
The term "loss" in reference to ADP assets can
be interpreted in varying degrees. It need not necessarily
mean total destruction but rather could refer to:
1. Denial of the resource, e.g. computer center held
hostage, tape library index sabotaged, etc.
2. Modification (intentional or not) e.g. systems
programmer changes code to defraud a payroll system





Although a proper risk assessment will address these varying
degrees of loss and quite correctly assign different
potential loss values accordingly, one will find that
modification, disclosure, and theft are more of security
considerations than disaster planning. Since the objective
of this paper is to analyze disaster planning, the term
"loss" will be used in the context of computing resource
destruction and or denial.
c. Priority
The first step of the loss potential estimate
identifies assets. The next step involves prioritizing them
so that proper protection and backup can be afforded to the
high priority items. An example of priorities would
identify critical time limits for each asset loss as
follows:
1 . Loss of this equipment/capability for more than some
acceptable number of hours could seriously
damage the organization.
2. Loss of this equipment for more than some acceptable
number of days would be serious.
3. Loss of this equipment for more than some acceptable
number of weeks/months would be serious.
4. This equipment/capability is non-essential and may
be replaced at earliest convenience.
Obviously, the highest priority (number 1 ) items would be
the first to bring up in the recovery phase of a disaster.
They may in fact be the only ones possible to bring up
quickly with the limited resources available following a
25

disaster. As recovery progresses the lower priority items
would be brought up.
2. Threat Analysis
It will be necessary to determine which threats pose
the most serious damage to the system. For example, one
might consider the threat of earthquakes because of a
location in California, whereas a location in Florida would
not be concerned (For them, hurricanes would be
threatening.) Probability can be assigned to these risks
through the the aid of such services as the National
Earthquake Information Center, the National Weather Service,
and by using historical data. FIPS publication 31 provides
a very thorough list of threats to consider and who to
















(1) Chemical, petroleum, explosive operations
(2) High crime areas
(3) Airports (this hazard is a real concern for Fleet
Numerical Oceanographic Center, Monterey and the Naval
26

Postgraduate School, both of whom are in the flight
path of Monterey Airport).












Not all of these threats will be applicable to each computer
operation, but probabilities of occurrence will indicate
which ones to worry about. Preventive measures which can be
taken to reduce these risks will be discussed is section V-
(B).
3. Annual Loss Expectancy
Combining the loss potential estimate and threat
analysis (probabilities) will produce a basis for
determining what is reasonable to spend on security measures
for each asset. That is, multiply the loss potential by the
probability of occurrence to obtain an annual estimate of
the loss. Since probabilities are not always easy to
generate, all estimates should be viewed cautiously and




The level of detail described in this discussion is quite
superficial and is not indicative of the level of effort
involved in risk analysis. Risk analysis is time-consuming
and tedious, but it is perhaps the most crucial step of
disaster planning since it lays the foundation for future
action.
B. PREVENTIVE MEASURES
"The most overlooked part of a disaster is avoiding it"
[14]. In conjunction with the risk analysis, it is prudent
to undertake certain preventive measures which will reduce
the exposure to risk.
1 . Controlling Access
Unauthorized access can be controlled through
physical barriers such as "man-traps", walls, locked doors,
fences, guards, electronic monitoring devices, and security
badges. The best way is to physically secure the computer
and vital resources and lock unnecessary personnel out.
2. Natural Disaster Preparation
Natural disasters are more difficult to control;
however, structural engineers and architects can assist in
designing sturdy earthquake resistant [15], storm resistant,
and fire retardant buildings. Installed C02f Halon 1301,
sprinklers and portable fire extinguishers will
significantly reduce fire hazard if personnel are properly
trained to use them. This means that fire drills and
training should be a regular part of the data processing
28

operation. All personnel should be able to locate the
proper valves and equipment in an emergency situation
(particularly in the dark).
3. Avoiding Proximity Hazards
If possible, selection of the ADP center location
should be made with these risks of natural disaster in mind
as well as any proximity hazards (discussed in chapter V-A-
2-c). There is not always the option of site selection,
(particularly when the disaster plan is being set up after
construction) so protection from these hazards is usually
the best solution. Although one may not be able to
affordably protect a building from disasters such as an
airplane crash; vital information, documentation, tapes and
software can be safely stored off-site to protect some of
the assets.
4. Adequate Supporting Utilities
Failure of supporting utilities can be covered by
such things as an Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) with
generator backup, redundancy of equipment, vigorous preven-
tive maintenance, and close monitoring of vital signs,
5 . Protecting Personnel
One of the most valuable assets in an ADP operation
is personnel. Some of the skills lost in a disaster would
be irreplaceable, and it would be difficult to assign a
dollar value to their worth. A small investment in training
can go a long way in benefitting the overall security of the
29

organization. Often overlooked programs such as First Aid,
Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR), and emergency drills
can save precious lives during an accident or disaster (both
on and off the job). Additionally, it is unwise to become
dependent on a small number of individuals. It is
inevitable in any organization that a few highly motivated
individuals take it upon themselves to "know it all." These
persons should be identified and encouraged to share their
knowledge with the rest of the data center by writing
documentation and conducting training. Personnel should be
cross- trained to the maximum extent possible so that
emergency personnel shortages can be filled expeditiously.
This relieves the urgency that would result if one key man
were missing. It also provides an enriched job environment
for the employees, allows them to grow, and motivates them
to take a personal interest in their data center. This has
positive results on a day-to-day basis and prepares
personnel for disaster recovery. A final recommendation
about personnel is that an active recruiting program should
be in effect. It is important to maintain contact with the
job market and keep files on possible recruits. This will
provide some depth which can be fallen back upon in an
emergency,
6, Documentation
As mentioned previously, documentation can be a
valuable tool for training but it is also invaluable in a
30

disaster recovery. The personnel, equipment, and
environment may all be completely different in the aftermath
of a disaster and good documentation may be the only way to
bring the system back together. Therefore, it should be
well written, easily understandable, up to date, and safely
stored off site.
7. Hardware Reliability
There are several areas of preventive measures that
deal with the hardware in an installation. First and most
obvious is scheduled maintenance which must be carried out
religiously in order to provide reliable equipment. High
operational tempo should not be allowed to supersede
preventive maintenance or else machine down time will
seriously impact upon the DP schedule. Other preventive
measures involve protecting the environment in which the
machines operate. Ensure that the temperature remains cool
and stable. If the equipment is exposed to possible water
damage, provide equipment covers (something as inexpensive
as rolls of polyethylene for a few dollars can save millions
of dollars worth of computers from water damage from above.)
Instruct operations personnel on the location of these
covers, how to secure the computers, and what to do in
minimizing water damage. Drills should be conducted
frequently to ensure familiarity with these procedures.
31

8. Emergency Action Plan
In preparation for a disaster it is necessary to
draw up a detailed Emergency Action Plan. This includes
checkoff sheets for varying degrees of emergencies, with
personnel assignments (by name) for actions to be taken in
each possible situation. For example, a section describing
actions to be taken during a fire might include:
— If small fire, attempt to extinguish with portable CO2,
at same time sound fire alarm.
--Shift supervisor: notify fire department (phone number
XXX and secure equipment if necessary.
The plan should include who to contact, phone numbers, and
the sequence of actions to combat the initial emergency.
Obviously this plan must be kept up to date as personnel,
numbers and equipment change, and it should be tested
frequently to make sure that it works smoothly.
C. RECOVERY PLAN
The final part of the contingency plan will be a
recovery plan to prepare for reconstruction and/or putting
the system back on line. It may provide for a temporary
installation to begin with and subsequent rebuilding of the
facilities or numerous other alternatives discussed in the
following sections. It is common to see organizations with
little or no recovery plans at all. In these situations,
the management may believe that the risk of disaster is so
small that the cost for a recovery plan is not worthwhile.
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In many cases they have got neither the time nor the money
for such a plan and they intend to react in "the seat of the
pants" mode when a disaster occurs. Interviews with the
Data Center managers at the Naval Postgraduate School, Navy
Regional Data Automation Center, San Francisco, and the
County of Monterey Data Processing center have indicated
that this is not an unreasonable alternative in their minds.
They have faith that hardware vendors would go to
extraordinary lengths to replace any damaged equipment as
quickly as possible (to the extent of shipping the next
computer to come off the assembly line or diverting one
intended for somebody else). They believe that a staff of
essential personnel could pull together the necessary
details for re-assembling the computer center. This is
simply too optimistic and a very easy escape from the cost
involved in an adequate recovery plan. Since it would be
politically undesirable to espouse a policy of having no
disaster plan, most prudent data center managers have
established some type of minimum plan; usually a reciprocal
agreement with some other data centers. These reciprocal
agreements can be an oral agreement or a written contract
between two or more data centers which promise to provide




1 . Letters of Agreement
When reciprocal agreements are undertaken, the
written contract is usually preferred over an oral
agreement. In this way, most facilities can legally solve
the requirement for data center backup. While such
agreements may look adequate on paper, they seldom come
close to being useful in the true disaster situation, John
P. Murray, in his January 1980 Data Management article made
the following comment on the sufficiency of letters of
agreement, "While these are the least expensive methods (for
disaster recovery) they are also the least effective." [16]
There are numerous problems with this type of backup, the
most probable of which is the fact that no two systems are
going to be completely compatible. Even if the hardware
suite is exactly the same, it is highly unlikely that the
operating systems are the same. ° Full compatibility
requires continual update of the contingency plan to ensure
that critical applications will run on the backup system.
Realistically, it must be understood that most ADP centers
simply do not have the excess capacity to provide backup
for someone else during prime time. (The capacity may be
available on the midnight shift, and if this is acceptable
to the afflicted center, it may be a workable agreement.) If
the center does have unplanned extra capacity, it is
probably not operating its equipment very efficiently. The
point is that even an operation operating at moderate
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capacity would be placing itself into a contingency
situation in the event of someone else's disaster. There is
no guarantee that the backup facility will be willing to
sacrifice its own operation because of another's misfortune,
and the promised resources might not materialize as planned.
If the resources were made available, the agreements usually
have no specification as to length of time that backup will
be provided. Obviously the backup center cannot operate for
very long at a reduced capacity.
Finally, it is extremely difficult to test these
contingency plans and keep them current. Only two of
fourteen activities with letters of agreement, in the GAO
study, had tested their plans within the past year [1].
Reasons for not testing them included lack of available
funds and non-availability of the backup system. The
conclusion is that letters of agreement are relatively
useless as a sole means of backup; however, they may provide
reasonable alternatives as part of a contingency plan as
long as the following guidelines are adhered to :
--The backup center should have nearly identical equip-
ment.
°Note: These agreements usually provide a certain
amount of shared resources between the recovery center and
the afflicted centers. This does not usually provide for the




-The backup plan should be executed during slack time or
on a computer with excess capacity. (In other words, the
execution of the plan should not place the backup center
in a disaster situation).
-The agreement contract should be specific as to amounts
of processing time and duration of contingency
operations.
-The agreement should provide for frequent test
opportunities in order to keep it current.
2. Dual Systems and Distributed Systems
The concept of dual systems involves probably the
most complete solution to computer backup by having two
exact duplicate systems operational as backups for each
other. This option is extremely expensive and is only
justifiable in a few cases. It also has a number of major
cost tradeoffs which may limit its effectiveness. Ideally
the backup system would be completely idle, standing by for
the occurrence of a disaster. This would probably not be
justifiable and would realistically have applications being
run on it to increase the cost effectiveness of the system.
The tradeoff would involve ensuring that enough excess
capacity was available to handle critical operations yet
utilizing the system as efficiently as possible to justify
costs. Increased utilization would jeopardize backup
response, and better response would waste resources.
Another consideration is how to distribute
operations personnel. If the backup system were in complete
standby, the personnel needs would be minimal. As the
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attempt to make efficient use of the backup facility-
increases, so does the need for personnel. This may
necessitate wasteful duplication of effort in the two
separate systems. One more problem would be the question of
where to locate the two systems. Close proximity would
limit personnel, maintenance, facilities and support costs
but would make both systems susceptible to many of the same
disasters. Separation would increase these costs yet
provide more secure protection against disaster. As a final
negative point about the dual systems concept, a GAO
investigation [17] frowned upon the Air Force's proposal to
implement such systems at several of its bases. The GAO
felt that dual systems were not justifiable since the
workload could be handled by a single large CPU. The Air
Force had failed to present a strong argument based on
disaster planning which would have been difficult for GAO to
refute. Ironically GAO came out with a report one year
later which criticized most Federal Agencies for lack
of disaster planning [1].
Organizations which are willing to pay the enormous
price of dual systems usually have a lot at stake when their
computers go down. One example is Chemical Bank of New
York, which established a second site operation 40 miles
away from its main system. [18] With critical applications
identified, they divided the load between the two systems
and set up a plan to run on either system during disaster.
37

Another company, TOWLE Manufacturing Corporation which
processes one thousand orders per day (including over 10,000
line items of Leonard Silver), has also set up a second site
but intends to use it almost exclusively for backup. Since
they couldn't justify a completely idle computer, they have
carefully selected a few outside users to defray some of the
expense. By carefully monitoring the usage so that enough
reserve is available for Towle's critical applications, they
have developed a very reasonable and secure backup system.
A reasonable extension to the idea of dual (or
multiple systems) is the concept of distributed systems.
This blossoming technology offers an economical means of
sharing computing resources and may be a feasible solution
to disaster planning very soon. The details, pros and cons
of distribution will be left as a topic for future research,
3. Disaster Recovery Centers
Rather than undertaking to build a backup site on
its own, an organization may opt to subscribe to a
commercial Disaster Recovery Center. These come in two
basic forms: a "shell site" or a "hot site."
a. Shell Site
A shell site is basically a place to go when
one's computer center is annihilated. It contains no
computers or peripherals, but has adequate chill water
connections, air conditioning, raised floors, and power
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sufficient to sustain a computer installation. Either the
subscriber must provide the equipment when a disaster
recovery is initiated, or in some cases the vendor assists
in obtaining the necessary gear. These sites range widely
in price depending upon the size of facilities, and what is
included in the services. One company, DCI, provides the
shell for $750/month membership fee with no disaster
notification fee. However, if the disaster lasts over 90
days the occupant must pay $20
,
000 / month thereafter.
Another company, Data Processing Security Inc. of Fort
Worth, Texas, charges an $84,000 fee for a minimum seven-
year membership and $12,000 per year thereafter, plus a pre-
specified amount per month during actual usage. This
provides 18,000 sq. ft. of computer space with all necessary
environmental support and 15,000 sq. ft. of office space.
The price can become quite steep and full
recovery from the disaster is still dependent on how quickly
the equipment can be obtained. If the current operation is
using equipment that may be difficult to procure or that may
involve a long lead time to acquire, it would be unwise to
pay for a shell site which couldn't be used immediately due
to lack of equipment,
b. Hot Site
This alternative provides a standby system at a
separate site which can generally be accessed within hours
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of a disaster. Commercial facilities have sprung up in
numerous states which provide specific vendor compatible
systems. For example, SUNGARD of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
has several recovery centers housing IBM 3033 's and its fees
range up to $5, 500/month, $50,000 disaster notification fee
(4 hour notice) and $8,000/day usage. COMDISCO Disaster
Recovery Services Inc. charges up to $4, 00 0/month, $10,000
disaster notification, and $4,000/day usage. These prices
all vary according to the system and services provided but
in general are a very expensive alternative. They are
however, a quite attractive option to banks or large
corporations which risk great financial loss for every hour
of computer down time.
In order to be effective, the hot site must be
properly configured to match the user's home system and it
must be used for testing regularly to ensure continued
compatibility. Any significant changes in the
organization's operations must be promptly reflected in the
backup site's disaster plan. It would be quite tragic to
pay for a backup system with guaranteed two hour access and
not be able to run the software due to incompatibility.
Off-site documentation, files, systems and applications
software must be kept current.
Although the hot site alternative is a very
thorough means of backup, it has several drawbacks (some of
which are particular to the Navy) which limit is
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practicality. As mentioned before, it is very expensive and
may not be cost effective in many cases. Secondly, most
contracts contain an escape clause which limits the hot-site
vendor's liability in the event two or more subscribers have
a disaster concurrently. Basically, they try to accommodate
all parties but with limited equipment facilities. This
hardly seems fair since the subscriber would like a fail-
safe backup plan. Of course the vendors limit the number of
subscribers to one system (usually 100 or less) and reduce
risk by not accepting subscribers with systems in the same
building. They also try to keep the number of subscribers
from the same city or power grid to a minimum. Since the
larger vendors have numerous recovery centers throughout the
United States, they feel that multiple disasters would not
present a problem (it very well shouldn't when the client is
paying more than $65,000/year for these services.) Sources
at the Naval Data Automation Command, Washington, D.C. state
that another problem which applies to the Navy is the
duration of funding for Operation and Maintenance (O&M).
Operation and maintenance. Navy funds may only be obligated
in one year intervals and they are incrementally funded by
Congress. This limits participation in multi-year
obligation such as many of the hot-site contracts require.
41

c. shared Backup Site
A third type of disaster recovery center offers
a more reasonable alternative to the commercial hot site.
Numerous businesses have banded together to set up their own
disaster recovery centers. In this way they can share
expenses and provide less expensive backup for their
systems. A group of fourteen companies in Minnesota formed
a corporation called Eloigne Corp. and built a recovery
center in St. Paul. Although they have only a shell site,
an actual hot-site could be established as well. One
company, Computer Alternatives, has made a business of
matching organizations with excess capacity to those needing
backup. It arranges for primary and secondary backup to
insure adequate coverage for its clients. This method is a
bit more concrete than the previously described reciprocal
agreements and has already proven its effectiveness in the
case of United States Tobacco Company of Greenwich, Ct.
,
which successfully recovered from a recent disaster. They
had been backed up by Curti ss-Wr ight Corporation of
Woodridge, New Jersey through arrangement by Computer
Alternatives. This type of matching service seems like an
interesting proposition for the Navy if implemented by an
organization such as NAVDAC. Admittedly there may not be a
lot of excess computer capacity floating around in the Navy,
but this would certainly be a much more organized approach
to backup than current reciprocal agreements.
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Additionally, the Navy might consider setting up its own
disaster recovery centers to be shared by selected
significant data processing centers,
4. Automatic Data Processing Service Centers
If a thorough risk analysis has been conducted, the
use of an ADP service center might be considered in light of
disaster planning. In disaster planning, one is primarily
concerned with the how and when of getting critical
applications back on line. As discussed previously, an ideal
situation would have a standby system waiting to pick up the
load upon the occurrence of a disaster. This standby
capability might be provided by an ADP service center
through leased timesharing. Certainly it would be
unreasonable to expect a service bureau to take on a
disaster befallen customer with no advance notice however, a
reasonable contingency plan could be worked out to provide
for rapid availability of resources. One possible scheme
could involve the monthly purchase of timesharing services
at a level commensurate with the needs of the critical
applications for a particular organization. These
timesharing services could be used to run the high priority
jobs at the service center while the in-house computers ran
the less critical jobs ( these would be pre-empted by the
critical jobs in the event of a service bureau problem). The
converse of this idea would probably be even more attractive
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since critical applications could be kept in-house and less
critical jobs contracted out. The key to this plan would be
guaranteeing enough resources at the service bureau by
purchasing monthly timesharing, and also ensuring that vital
applications would be able to run on the service center's
system. This plan is quite viable but entails precise risk
analysis to identify the essential jobs and requires
frequent testing to ensure compatibility of systems.
5. Documents and Vital Information for Recovery
a. Backing Up Data
It is essential that proper measures be taken to
protect more than just the hardware. Without the software
and data, the computer system will be of little use. Most
organizations realize that replacement of software and data
after a disaster would be a much more serious problem than
replacement of hardware. It is quite common for software
development to take hundreds of man-months of effort. Thus
it would be almost impossible to re-develop any but the
simplest of applications in time to stage a disaster
recovery. The same logic applies to large databases and
particularly to transaction files; they could be lost with
no possibility of redevelopment in a major disaster. For
these reasons, it is uncommon to find an organization that
does not back up its software and data files. The frequency
of back up is dependent upon each particular data processing
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environment, but the risk analysis will indicate which files
are critical and how often to dump tapes for off-site
storage. Howard Schaeffer discusses database copying in
greater detail in his text on data center operations [19].
b. Backing Up Documentation
Contrary to the diligence with which data
processing centers usually back up their files, they are
often negligent when it comes to backing up their
documentation. It is likely that in the aftermath of a
disaster the normal operations staff will not be completely
available, and therefore documentation should be adequate
for others to carry out the data processing functions.
Information that is routinely kept in the data processing
shop must also be safely stored elsewhere. This information
includes:
--Names, phone numbers, and addresses of vendors,
suppliers, and key disaster recovery personnel
--A comprehensive list and description of all equipment,
peripherals, office furniture, and supplies
—Copies of written agreements and contracts
—A listing of job ( application) priorities
--Operations manuals and source code
—Blueprint of physical plant layout
— List of equipment requirements in terms of electrical
power, air conditioning, chill water, space, etc..
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A comprehensive list of vital documents was published by the
Toronto Chapter of the Association of Records Managers and
Administrators [20]. The ease with which these documents can
be obtained will be a critical factor in the success of
disaster recovery. It would be unwise to store them in a
vault which only offered access during typical nine to five
weekday work hours (a disaster is not likely to abide by
this timetable). Therefore it is prudent to keep copies of
the disaster plan at various accessible locations (one
authority suggests keeping copies of the plan in several
disaster team leaders' houses - with all due regard to
security considerations.) To recapitulate, the disaster
recovery planning phase is virtually a waste of time unless
the documents and vital information are themselves properly
protected to survive a disaster.
D. CONSULTING SERVICES
1 . Developing the Plan is a Fulltime Job
One inevitable question that must be answered before
an organization begins development of a disaster plan is
who will actualize the plan. This a difficult situation
because creating the plan is a full time job; a part time
effort will usually be inadequate. It is typical however,
for most data processing organizations to attempt
development of their disaster plans by assigning the project
to an operations manager. The project becomes an overload
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to the individual assigned and often takes a lower priority
than day-to-day crises. Several problems occur when the
disaster plan is only a part time effort. First of all, the
organization must operate without a recovery plan for the
duration of the development. This in itself is a compelling
reason to get the plan implemented expeditiously. Secondly,
if the data processing organization is undergoing any
change, the disaster plan will be obsolete before it reaches
completion. For these reasons many data centers have
assigned a risk manager whose job it is to ensure that the
risk analysis is complete and that the proper contingency
planning has been executed. Not all organizations are
fortunate enough to have the in-house experience and
expertise necessary to carry out this function, and they
should consider consulting services in order to do the job
properly.
2. Advantages of a Consulting Firm
An experienced consulting firm can offer numerous
advantages in developing a disaster plan. Since they will
be working full time on the plan, they will be able to
implement it without the encumbrance of daily operations as
experienced by in-house employees. They will also have the
background and prior experience which will make their
efforts more efficient. Data processing organizations
typically take years to come up with a usable design,
whereas consultants can offer results in a matter of months.
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The outside consultant may also be more credible
and able to implement change in the organization. An
operations manager at Davoe Raynolds Company in Louisville,
Kentucky claimed,
"I didn't have the clout to pull all the managers into a
room to discuss disaster recovery, but when the
consultants came and we were paying for them, all
executives involved had to come."[21]
As human nature would have it, people will believe and
follow the advice of an outside consultant more readily than
they would believe employees. This may stem from another
advantage of the consultant—objectivity. Whereas employees
may not recognize poor security procedures due to
acclamation to normal routine, an outside observer would not
be so biased. Top level management can more easily accept a
consultant's advice as unprejudiced. This can be a most
important point since disaster planning will only be
successful with top management support.
3. Consulting Costs
Depending on the size of the data processing
operation, consultant fees range from $20,000 to over
$200,000. This is usually far less than it would cost the
client to produce a plan of similar quality if he attempted
to do it himself. Some firms offer an economical
alternative to clients who insist on providing their own
manpower. The consultant provides manuals, tools, and
guidance and the client does the legwork. Such an
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arrangement can cost between $7,000 and $10,000. If cost
is the major concern, this is very appealing; however, it
loses many of the advantages of outside consultants such as
objectivity, credibility, and experience.
In summary, the level of expertise available in-
house will determine whether or not consulting services are
needed, but it would be wise to consider their services in
terms of selling the disaster plan to top level management,
comparative costs, and the time necessary to implement the
plan. For lists of who to contact regarding disaster and




VI. APPLICABILITY TO NAVY ADP SYSTEMS - POLICIES
AND DIRECTIVES
As previously stated, Navy ADP centers do not operate on
a profit motive, so what factors can motivate them to
prepare for a disaster? Basically they will be influenced by
mission requirements, governing directives, and budgetary
considerations. Since mission requirements will vary from
center to center, it should suffice to say that each manager
will have to determine how vital his data processing
applications are in the scheme of overall objectives, and
plan for protection of these assets accordingly. Such an
evaluation would include a thorough risk analysis as
discussed in Chapter V-A.
A. DIRECTIVES
Another area of influence will be the directives and
policies under which Navy data processing centers must
operate. The major emphasis of these directives will be
discussed and the reader is referred to the documents
themselves for further detail. The Government has provided
some initial guidance through the Office of Management and
Budget (0MB) and the National Bureau of Standards (NBS). 0MB
Circular A-71 , Transmittal Memorandum 1 entitled. Security
of Federal Automated Information Systems , directs the heads
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of each executive branch department and agency to ensure
that they have an adequate security program [25]. Such a
security program must include a valid disaster plan for
computer operations. In this circular, 0MB tasked the
Department of Commerce (which is responsible for the NBS) to
develop and issue standards for assuring security of
Automated Information Systems (AIS).
This tasking included specifying :
—Whether the standard is mandatory or voluntary
--Specific implementation actions
—Time constraints within which compliance must be made
—A process for monitoring and evaluating use
—Conditions for any waivers
These objectives had already been partially accomplished
through FIPS publication 31
, Guidelines for ADP Physical
Security and Risk Management [12]. The General Services
Administration (GSA) was tasked with enforcing security
requirements including contingency planning.
The National Bureau of Standards enhanced FIPS publication
31 in 1981 with its Guidelines for ADP Contingency Planning
,
FIPS publication 87 [13]. These guidelines are directed
toward agencies specified in OMB's circular A-71,
Transmittal Memorandum 1. FIPS publication 87 is a summary
of actions necessary to formulate an ADP contingency plan.
It makes no claim to being all inclusive, but it is a good
foundation upon which management can base its plan. Finally,
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the Chief of Naval Operations, being responsible for ADP
security within the Department of the Navy (DON) has issued
his directive on implementation of contingency planning for
Navy ADP activities, OPNAVINST 5239. 1A [2]. While allowing
Commanding Officers of certain activities some latitude by
making them the Designated Approving Authority (DAA) of
their own contingency plans, the Commander Naval Data
Automation Command (NAVDAC) has been made overseer of all
plans for levels I and II data.^ This will allow NAVDAC to
ensure consistency in the plans and will provide a service
for technical guidance in developing the plans. All DON ADP
activities were given nine months within which to execute
these directives issued in August, 1 982. Aside from the
oversight by NAVDAC, ADP systems and their security are
subject to audit by the Naval Audit Service. This may be a
command requested review or may take place as part of a
scheduled audit of the activity.
Whereas previous directives on ADP security and
contingency planning had placed the responsibility at high
levels with little or no enforcement at the field activity
level, current directives have provided the technical
7
'Level I Data - Classified data; Level II Data -
Unclassified data requiring special handling, eg. privacy
act information. For Official Use Only, etc.; Level III
Data - All other unclassified data.
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support and have pushed the responsibility down to the
proper level. The means for enforcement have been enacted,
and if staffing levels permit proper auditing, violators
will soon be exposed. The message and intent are clear— the
CNO wants all of his ADP activities to implement and
maintain comprehensive contingency plans.
B. FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS
Although the guidelines for disaster planning are clear,
the means for funding it are problematic. Disaster planning
does not show immediate rewards and in fact may never pay
off if a disaster does not occur. Disaster plans are
expensive and there is always the question of "how much is
enough?" It is difficult to justify additional costs when
budgets are being cut and merely meeting day-to-day
operating expenses is a major concern. Another problem,
inherent in the Navy's personnel assignment policy, is the
short-term perspective of military employees. Disaster
planning is something that keys on long-term benefits at the
expense of initial significant costs. A military tour of
duty lasting two to three years provides a very small window
of time within which to excel. Capital intensive long-term
objectives tend to make a poor impression in the short run
and thus military commanders are hesitant to embark upon
projects which will not bear fruit during their tenure. This
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type of problem can only be alleviated by superiors who
realize the sacrifice necessary to implement a disaster
planning program. If the CNO's security program is
indicative of policy-level sentiment in the area of
contingency planning, then a positive trend is developing
which will eliminate some of these problems. Finally, the
execution of a risk analysis and threat survey are the basis
for justifying any expenditures in disaster planning,
therefore they must be thoroughly prepared and reliable.
These studies will make acceptance of the budget more
palatable to upper level management and enhance the
arguments for instituting a disaster plan as soon as
possible.
C. PROBLEMS FOR ADP SERVICE CENTERS
Although the procedure for justifying a disaster plan
for one's own data processing center may be straightforward,
the problem takes on a much different perspective for a
service center which is running applications for numerous
other activities. The risk analysis phase becomes extremely
complex as the needs of many customers must be integrated
into some type of cohesive disaster plan.
1 . Who Conducts the Risk Analysis?
One of the Navy's regional service centers, NARDAC
San Francisco, has attempted to fit its contingency plan
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into the customer base by working with each customer to
arrive at a dollar value for each application that it runs.
This value reflects what the customer feels it would cost to
replace the software, hardware, information, administrative
procedures, plant/facilities, telecommunications, and
personnel necessary to support his applications. While this
may be a valid means of determining some index of the data
center's value, it can provide very misleading information
on the relative value/importance of customer applications.
Therefore, this type of estimate might be useful for
determining how much to spend in protecting the assets, but
it is not an accurate guide for prioritizing importance of
individual applications programs. For example: A small
customer may depend exclusively upon the NARDAC for its data
processing needs and estimate its applications at a value of
$50,000. A larger activity may only parcel out a fraction
of its data processing to the NARDAC and assign a value of
$100,000. Which application is the most critical? If
they are compared monetarily, the larger activity wins out.
But what about analyzing capability to continue their
missions? The small activity would be wiped out by this
data processing loss whereas the large activity might suffer
only minor inconvenience. Who would be to blame for such a
loss? Most NARDACs believe that it is their obligation to
provide contingency planning for their customers. They must
keep in mind that merely providing backup for a customer's
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application hardly constitutes a contingency plan. Gerald
I. Isaacson, Director, Computer Security Institute's Educa-
tional Resource Center, claims that,
"Disaster recovery planning is not a data processing
problem, it's a corporate problem."
"In disaster planning, you're not really trying to
back up the data center, you're trying to provide
survivability for the organization in the absence of the
normal data center." [18]
While it is important for the data center to be involved in
disaster planning, it should not bear the entire tasking nor
should it assume the entire financial burden. In the case
of NARDACs it is unrealistic to believe that they can fully
understand their customers' mission needs and be able to
integrate them all under one scheme. The users should
develop their own plans and coordinate them with the NARDAC.
The customer should find out how the data processing center
intends to handle any contingency (from short outages up
through total disaster) and plan accordingly. For instance,
what priority will be given to its applications in a limited
outage? While this may not constitute a disaster for the
data processing center, it may do so for the user if his
programs are given a low priority for processing.
Since it would be highly uneconomical for each
customer to plan for its own disaster recovery center, it
would be wise for them to support a scheme whereby the
NARDAC had some type of a backup facility. The NARDAC
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concept originated to take advantage of centralized
resources and provide regional experts for data processing.
This advantage should be retained by a regionalized disaster
recovery plan. The complexity of such a plan would be
manageable if all customers could develop their own risk
analyses and assign priority to their jobs as discussed in
chapter V-A-1-c. The threat analysis would be mostly
conducted by the NARDAC, and the customer would coordinate
loss expectancies with NARDAC,
2. Who Pays for the Plan?
In answer to the question "who pays for this
service?", it would be reasonable for NARDAC to pass some of
these overhead costs on to the customer. Obviously, this
type of consulting and planning is a valuable service for
which clients should be willing to pay. It is not a service
which would necessarily be provided by a similar commercial





This paper has raised numerous questions regarding the
Navy's state of readiness in disaster planning for ADP
centers. The United States government in general has become
highly dependent upon computing systems. The Navy in
particular, is subject to financial, organizational,
mission-degrading, low-morale, and life-threatening problems
when its computers fail, and therefore must ensure
preparedness for computer disasters.
In the past, the Navy has placed less emphasis on
disaster planning than commercial activities. Reasons for
this included:
— lack of profit motive
--short-term tenure of military personnel and thus short-
term goals
--lack of adequate directives
—unclear responsibility
—no high level support or enforcement
These trends are changing in large part due to high
level interest in the Navy's ADP Security. There are now
adequate guidelines and directives; however, it remains to
be seen how well these directives will be enforced.
Inevitably the axe will fall on data center managers who
happen to be unprepared at the unfortunate occurrence of a
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disaster. The question remains "are Navy ADP centers
prepared for disaster?" Most are taking heed of the
directives and contingency planning has begun, yet the
efficacy of these plans remains to be seen. Realizing that
preparation for a disaster does not yield immediate rewards,
most managers are easing into the requirements on a limited
basis and are probably doing the best that they can while
staying within budgetary constraints.
To continue the momentum of high level interest, I
believe that NAVDAC should sponsor a team of experts to
conduct periodic assist visits in the area of ADP security
and contingency planning. Under the guidance of the team, an
activity could develop its plan while adhering to some type
of consistent standards. The team could also help to
validate current plans and ensure that they remain workable.
The allowance of individual Commanding Officer discretion
in approving security plans is quite appropriate; however,
it would be beneficial to both the Navy and the activities
for NAVDAC to have this type of oversight responsibility.
As suggested in this paper, there are numerous topics
for further research on the topic of disaster planning. The
areas of tactical systems and systems which process level I
(classified) data require enormous security considerations
when planning for disaster. The field of distributed
computing may offer great potential for backing up a system
but there are tradeoffs to be considered when the system is
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dispersed (especially when large geographic distances are
involved.
)
Finally, a useful follow-up study could examine how well
the Navy ADP centers have actually complied with the CNO's
directives and which disaster recovery alternatives have
been the most popular.
In conclusion, the following recommended reference
material will provide adequate step by step guidance for
Navy ADP managers to carry out the process of disaster
planning in a thorough manner.
Overall Summary
(1) Shaw, James K., "An Executive Guide to ADP
Contingency Planning," Draft NBS Spec Pub 500-xx, July 1981.
Center for Programming Science and Technology, Institute for
Computer Sciences and Technology, National Bureau of
Standards, Washington, D.C. 20234.
(2) "Disaster Recovery Just In Case," Ref. [21].
(3) "Data Security: Plan for the Worst," Ref. [22].
(4) Disaster Preparedness, Office of Emergency
Preparedness Report to Congress, stoclc no. 4102-0006,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
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